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JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
IN MULTIPLE-CLAIM CASES
THOMAS F. GREEN, JR.*
The jurisdictional problem peculiar to a case which involves more
than one claim is: Shall the court entertain the entire action when
it would have jurisdiction of one or more of the claims, but not
all, if they were sued separately?' The application of this question
to the United States district courts raises conflicting considerations.
On the one hand is the fact that most of the claims which would
not be within federal jurisdiction if sued alone, present questions of
state rather than federal law. In general the more appropriate
tribunals to deal with such questions in the first instance are the
state courts. On the other hand, it is desirable to have the parties
settle their disputes in one action. It is also desirable to settle in
one action disputes relating to a transaction or related transactions
even though more than two parties are involved. If some of the
claims involve patents, copyrights, or other matters within the
exclusive cognizance of the federal courts, these courts are the only
ones which can accomplish the two latter desiderata.
Federal-state relationships naturally involve complicated questions
of policy and the balancing of local and national interests. Problems
of constitutional and statutory interpretation are also present. Sup-
pose that the United States and another plaintiff bring an action in
which the United States pleads a claim in favor of it alone. Suppose
further that (a) the other plaintiff sets forth in the same complaint
a related claim that he alone has against the defendant, or (b) the
defendant pleads a counterclaim against the other plaintiff alone, or
(c) the defendant impleads another person on a third party com-
plaint, or (d) there are two defendants, one of whom cross-claims
against the other. Is an action involving (a) or (b) or (c) or (d) a
controversy to which the United States is a party within the mean-
ing of the Constitution? 2 Are they civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States?3 Must each counterclaim and cross-
claim show its own ground of federal jurisdiction independent of
grounds disclosed by the plaintiff's claim? Similar questions may
be put concerning federal questions, diversity of citizenship and other
grounds of jurisdiction as well as questions concerning other types
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. The present discussion will not cover venue or service of process.
2. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345 (1950).
MULTIPLE-CLAIMS CASES
of multiple-claim actions. In the present connection it seems useful
to examine the following procedural situations:
1. The joinder of claims by the plaintiff or plaintiffs in the com-
plaint in a United States district court.
2. The removal to such district court of an action in which the
complaint filed in the state court joined two or more claims-
3. Counterclaims.
4. Cross-claims.




JonD M IN TM COMPLAIMT
The joinder in a single complaint of a number of claims, each of
which would be within federal jurisdiction if sued alone, ordinarily
presents no jurisdictional problem. However, in case of an attempt
to join in one action a claim against the United States and a claim
against another defendant, the plaintiff may run into difficulties.
The Supreme Court has said that under the Tucker Act 4 the district
courts are not authorized to adjudicate suits which could not be
maintained in the Court of Claims. The Court continued, "The matter
is not one of procedure but of jurisdiction whose limits are marked
by the Government's consent to be sued.' 5 This seems to mean that
even where the district court wbuld have jurisdiction of each of the
two claims separately, one on the ground that the United States is
a party and the other on some other ground, the two claims cannot
be joined in a single proceeding in the district court.6 The Tucker
Act and its successors1 authorized the district court to entertain
suits against the United States for claims not exceeding $10,000
founded on a statute or a contract, and certain suits against the
United States to recover taxes alleged to have been improperly
collected. A more recent law of Congress is the Federal Tort Claims
Act.8 The decisions are in conflict on the question, whether a district
court may entertain a joint action against the United States and a
joint tort-feasor when there is diversity of citizenship between the
4. 24 STAT. 505, §§ 1, 2 (1887).
5. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 591, 61 Sup. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed.
1058 (1941).
6. The point actually was not involved in the case because there was
no independent ground of jurisdiction for the claim to which the United
States was not a party.
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (1950).
8. 60 STAT. 842 (1946). The Act is now codified and appears in various
sections of the Judicial Code. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950).
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plaintiff and the defendant other than the United States.9 Professor
Moore contends that joinder should be permitted between either
a Tucker Act claim or a tort claim against the United States on one
hand, and a claim against a different defendant on the other, if
grounds of federal jurisdiction exist for the latter claim and if
joinder is permissible from a procedural standpoint. He also takes
the position that a plaintiff or plaintiffs should not be prevented
by sovereign immunity from joining claims against the United
States. 0
Doubt exists as to the propriety of joining a claim triable before
a three-judge court with one triable before an ordinary, one-judge
district court. Where federal jurisdictional grounds are present for
both claims and the venue is proper, there appears to be no real
jurisdictional basis for refusing to entertain both in a single action."
When an admiralty claim is joined in a single proceeding with a
claim at law, the courts view the district court as though it were
two distinct courts, one having jurisdiction of admiralty suits and
the other of civil actions at law and in equity. Thus it is held that
a claim in admiralty cannot be joined with a tort claim at law against
a different defendant; 12 nor a claim by a plaintiff whose citizenship
is diverse from that of the defendant with a claim in admiralty by
a different plaintiff who is a citizen of the same state as defendant.18
Although the district court would have federal jurisdiction of each
claim separately and both arose from the same transaction and
have common questions, yet it cannot retain the two claims joined
in a single complaint. One must be dismissed. These cases reach
a result that is unfortunate and unnecessarily technical. While not
yet accepted by any court the sound view appears to be that the
court should have inherent power to decide both claims on the
merits.'
4
9. Joinder is proper: Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co. 83
F. Supp. 91 (D. Md.), rev'd in part, 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949); Bullock v.
United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1947); Englehardt v. United States, 69
F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947). Contra: Prechtl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889
(W.D.N.Y. 1949); Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948).
Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948); Uarte v. United
States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1949). See
also 7 VAxD. L. REv. 290 (1954).
10. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2737-39 (2d ed. 1948).
11. See Atlantic Lumber Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co., 2 F.R.D. 313 (D. Ore.
1941). But see New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-Op v. Wallace, 28 F.
Supp. 590, 593 (N.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd sub noam. New York State Guernsey
Breeders Co-Op v. Wickard, 141 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 725
(1944).
12. McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass.
1947); Eggleston v. Republic Steel Corp., 47 F. Supp. 658 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
13. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 155 F.2d 321,
325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946).
14. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2726 n.6 (2d ed. 1948).
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The most significant question concerning joinder by the plaintiff
or plaintiffs arises when independent grounds of jurisdiction exist
for some but not all of the claims. The answer as to whether the
court may take jurisdiction of the entire action depends upon whether
the case is filed originally in the United States district court or ar-
rives there by removal from a state court.
The statute conferring original jurisdiction was interpreted in
the leading case of Hum v. Oursler.15 There the plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the production of a play alleged to have incorpor-
ated therein certain ideas taken from the copyrighted and uncopy-
righted versions of a play written by plaintiffs. Damages and an
accounting were also prayed and the complaint alleged that the action
of defendants was a violation of the copyright laws of the United
States and also constituted unfair competition. All the parties were
citizens of the same state. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that the district court had jurisdiction of the issue of unfair
competition concerning the copyrighted play as well as the issue
of infringement; that the former should be decided on the merits
although there was found to be in fact no infringement of the copy-
right law. However, the trial court was held to have no jurisdiction
of allegations of unfair competition concerning the uncopyrighted
version of the play. The Court announced the doctrine that federal
jurisdiction extends to a federal ground and a nonfederal ground
in support of a single cause of action but not to a separate nonfederal
cause of action simply because it is joined with a federal cause of
action. The Hum case, therefore, stands for the proposition that
the matter in controversy in an action does not arise under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States so as to support
federal jurisdiction of the entire action unless all the causes of action
thus arise. The decision in the case was that one cause of action
arose under the laws of the United States and must be decided on
the merits but what the court found to be a second cause of action
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it did not so arise.
A cause of action was said to consist of the unlawful violation of
a right.' 6 Even if one disregards the dubiousness of the view which
considers the right involved to be a right to the protection of the
copyrighted play rather than a right to the protection of the play
whether copyrighted or uncopyrighted, the result is still surprising.
Where does the federal court get power to exercise jurisdiction over
15. 289 U.S. 238, 53 Sup. Ct. 586, 77 L. Ed. 1148 (1933). The particular
statutory provision which was applied by the case is now included in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1338 (1950). The doctrine of the Hum case was applied to an
action involving more than one defendant and brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act in Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 162 F.2d 524 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 765 (1947).
16. 289 U.S. at 246.
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only a part of an action? Both the Constitution and the statutes
indicate that the court will have jurisdiction of certain actions and
(by implication) will not have jurisdiction of any other actions. 7
The language suggests that from a jurisdictional standpoint the
courts are to deal with an action as a whole. Perhaps authority to
retain a part of a suit and dismiss another part was given by Section
5 of the Act of March 3, 1875,18 which may imply that, if a suit
involves a controversy within the jurisdiction and also a controversy
not within the jurisdiction, the suit shall not be dismissed. But Hurn
v. Oursler says that when the two controversies are two separate
causes of action the court does not have jurisdiction of the action.
If the action cannot be retained as a whole nor dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, the solution is to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, the
cause of action which lacks grounds of jurisdiction. This was the
course adopted in the I-urn case. Should both causes of action be
within the judicial power of an available state court and should the
plaintiff wish to try them together, he must seek to dismiss his
federal action.
The serious objection to the Hurn case is the difficulty of appli-
cation-the problems involved in distinguishing between situations
involving two causes of action and those involving merely two
grounds.19 Professor Wechsler suggests that Congress should give
jurisdiction over all claims that are asserted in a single action in
accordance with procedural rules of joinder but at the same time
give discretion to the trial judge to dismiss without prejudice any
claim not having its own grounds of federal jurisdiction. Under
this plan dismissal would be ordered unless the applicable principle
of substantive law is well settled in the state. Thus the assumption
of the functions of state courts would be minimized.
20
The Supreme Court has shown no inclination to abandon the Hurn
doctrine. Consequently, Congressional action will probably be the
only chance for a change. Congress undertook to deal with the subject
17. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1333 (1949), 1334-
1359 (1950).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 80 (1946), which was as follows: "If in any suit commenced
in a district court, or removed from a State court to a district court of the
United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said district court, at
any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit
does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said district court, or that the parties to said suit
have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or
defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under
this chapter, the said district court shall proceed no further therein, but shall
dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as
justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just."
This provision was omitted from the 1948 revision of Title 28.
19. Note, 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943); 32 MIcH. L. REV. 412 (1934).
20. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 216, 232-33 (1948).
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in the 1948 revision of Title 28 of the Code but the effect of the
provision is not altogether clear. The language is as follows: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a sub-
stantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark
laws."'2 1 The Code deals only with the narrow holding of Hurn v.
OursZer rather than the general principle because the principle an-
nounced by the case is not limited to unfair competition or to claims
under the copyright, patent or trademark laws.22 Whether the new
provision codifies the holding of the case or on the other hand ex-
pands the jurisdiction is debatable. The Reviser's Notes2 3 say that
the provision enacts the pre-existing rule but the words of the Code
subsection seem to be broader than the doctrine of the previous
decisions. 24 If the subsection is given the broader meaning, the result
will be that unfair competition claims can be joined with related
infringement claims even though each claim is a separate cause of
action but other demands will have to come within the principle
of Hum v. Oursler, i.e., will have to consist of state-law grounds and
federal grounds comprising the same cause of action.
The doctrine of the case when applied to some of the other grounds
of jurisdiction is even less acceptable than in the instance of the
existence of a federal question. For example, if an individual plaintiff
joins his cause of action with one by the United States against the
same defendant, the action seems to be one commenced by the United
States even though it is also commenced by the other plaintiff. If a
plaintiff joins in one complaint, in accordance with the rules of
pleading, a cause of action against the United States and another
against an individual defendant, the action is, according to the
normal meaning of language, one against the United States. The
statute25 does not say against the United States alone. Assuming
that sovereign immunity does not prevent it, 26 the district court should
take jurisdiction of such an action even when there is no diversity
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(b) (1950).
22. "[A] rule of general application." 289 U.S. at 245. Accord, Southern Pac.
Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1934). The passage of 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1338 (b) (1950) does not limit the taking of jurisdiction of a related ground
based on state law, to unfair competition or to copyright, patent, or trade-
mark cases. The broad rule, announced by the earlier cases, that when a
federal court has jurisdiction of a cause of action it will decide all questions
involved therein is followed by the cases decided since the adoption of the
section. Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427, 12 A.L.R.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1949);
South Side Theatres, Inc. v. United West Coast Theatres Corp., 178 F.2d 648
(9th Cir. 1949); Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942); Hogue v.
National Automotive Parts Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
23. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 at p.66 (1950).
24. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1815-16 n.9 (2d ed. 1948); Wechsler, supra
note 20, at 232.
25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1950).
26. See notes 5, 9 and 10 supra.
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of citizenship between the individuals; the fact that the United States
is a party is sufficient. The courts, however, do not seem inclined to
concede this 7 Indeed they go beyond what the language of the Hum
case requires. They decline to entertain a joint suit against the
United States and a joint tort-feasor who is a citizen of the same
state as the plaintiff.28 This result is reached by courts which refuse
to allow sovereign immunity alone to prevent joinder in a tort-claim
case.29 Yet it is arguable that the case presents a single cause of
action.30 The fact that an action and the single cause of action on
which it is based are both against the United States seems to be
sufficient ground for holding that the federal district court has juris-
diction of the action involving both defendants.
Although the presence of a substantial federal question will allow
a federal district court to adjudicate an entire cause of action, even
when it is necessary to decide questions of state law, the presence
of diversity of citizenship between one plaintiff and one defendant
is not sufficient to sustain original jurisdiction over an additional
party who is a citizen of the same state as a party on the other
side. The interpretation that the statute requires all the parties
on one side of the case to be citizens of different states from those
of which the parties on the other side are citizens, was first made
in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.31 Diversity in one cause of action appar-
ently will not justify original jurisdiction over another joined in
the same complaint if jurisdiction could not have been taken of the
second cause of action when sued on alone. 32 The question whether
the doctrine applies to claims between different parties was expressly
left open by the opinion in Strawbridge v. Curtiss where it was said:
"But the court does not mean to give an opinion in the case where several
parties represent several distinct interests, and some of those parties are,
and others are not, competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in the courts
of the United States."33
27. Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1947); Dickens v.
Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
28. Dickens v. Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
29. Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1947).
30. Brinsmead v. Harrison, L.R. 7 C.P. 547, 554 (Ex. Ch. 1872); PROSSER,
ToRTs 1096-97 (1941).
31. 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (U.S. 1806). See also New Orleans v. Winter,
1 Wheat. 91, 4 L. Ed. 44 (U.S. 1816); accord, Florida Cent. & P. Ry. v. Bell,
176 U.S 321 20 Sup. Ct. 399, 44 L. Ed. 486 (1900). The statutory language
when Strawbridge v. Curtiss was decided was more in keeping with the
decision in that case than the present language is. The statute read: "[Wihere
.. an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." 1 STAT. 73, 78 (1789).
32. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 539 (1931). If joined under FED. R. Crv. P. 18 (b) ancillary jurisdic-
tion would exist. Cf. Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture
Co., 20 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1927).
33. 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (U.S. 1806).
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The Supreme Court seems never to have decided the question but
its dictum in Hum v. Oursier to the effect that a federal court is
unable to entertain a cause of action not within its jurisdiction,
merely because that cause of action has mistakenly been joined in
the complaint with another which is within the jurisdiction, sounds
as though it applies to diversity as well as federal questions.
The jurisdictional amount is a statutory requirement,3 4 but the
statute does not say how the requirement shall be applied to multiple
claims. The cases allow the value of all the claims of a single plaintiff
against a single defendant to be added when joined in one suit.85 For
the purpose of reaching the jurisdictional minimum in the case of
multiple claims, by more than one plaintiff or against more than
one defendant, the total due on a joint claim or claims is the amount
in controversy 6 but claims due severally to or from multiple parties
cannot be added to reach the required minimum.3 7
REMOVAL OF CLAIMS JonED BY PLAINTIFF
The decisions establishing the requirement of complete diversity
were cases of original jurisdiction, i.e., actions filed in the federal
court by the plaintiff. In removal questions the removal statutes
have brought about a different result. In 1875 Congress passed an
act revising the jurisdictional law for the federal courts and included
a provision for the removal of cases involving what have become
known as separable controversies. 38 The statute provided for the re-
moval of the entire case to the federal court by the defendant or
defendants involved in a separable controversy wholly between
citizens of different states. The Supreme Court's decision in Barney
v. LathamP9 indicated that the district court could take jurisdiction
of a case in which there was not complete diversity of citizenship
if the parties interested in the separable controversy as plaintiffs
were citizens of states different from those of which the interested
defendants were citizens. The separable controversy has been spoken
of as a separate cause of action, and in a fairly recent case the Su-
34. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332 (1949).
35. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R.R. v. United States, 220 U.S. 94,
31 Sup. Ct. 368, 55 L. Ed. 384 (1911); Schunk v. Moline, Milburn & Stoddart Co.,147 U.S. 500, 13 Sup. Ct. 416, 37 L. Ed. 255 (1893); cf. Woodside v. Beckham,
216 U.S. 117, 30 Sup. Ct. 367, 54 L. Ed. 408 (1910) (no aggregation of claims held
by plaintiff as assignee for collection).
36. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 36 Sup. Ct. 416, 60 L. Ed. 817 (1916);
Pacific Live-Stock Co. v. Hanley, 98 Fed. 327 (C.C.D. Ore. 1899). Common
liability will also justify adding the value of multiple claims to reach thejurisdictional amount. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill,
266 U.S. 292, 45 Sup. Ct. 49, 69 L. Ed. 293 (1924); McDaniel v. Traylor,
196 U.S. 415, 25 Sup. Ct. 369, 49 L. Ed. 533 (1905).
37. Chamberlin v. Browning, 177 U.S. 605, 20 Sup. Ct. 820, 44 L. Ed. 906(1900); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 36 Sup. Ct. 416, 60 L. Fd 817 (1916).
38. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
39. 103 U.S. 205, 26 L. Ed. 514 (1881).
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preme Court seems to assume that the federal court on removal
could take jurisdiction of the entire case although complete diversity
was present only in the separable controversy and the different
controversies involved different causes of action.40 On the other
hand, in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases41 only one cause of action
was removed and the other causes of action involved in the state
court suit were left in the state court. Lower federal courts have
reached similar results.42 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
attempts to explain the difference between Barney v. Latham and the
Pacific Railroad case by saying that a separable controversy does
not arise from a joinder of numerous unrelated causes of action and
that in the case of unrelated causes of action the controversies are
separate rather than separable.43 The concepts involved are so dif-
ficult to apply that the reviser of Title 28 decided to eliminate the
distinction. For the separable controversy provision, the new Title
substitutes subsection (c) of Section 1441 which is as follows:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may
be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or,
in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within Its
original jurisdiction."44
40. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 Sup. Ct. 347, 83 L. Ed. 334
(1939). The contention has been made that an entire case removable on the
ground that it contained a separable controversy constituted but a single
cause of action. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 244 (1949).
However, Moore agrees (id. at 247) with the statement in the Pullman case,
305 U.S. at 539, "There was clearly a separable controversy with respect to
Kash." "The complaint alleged two causes of action, one against all the
defendants, the other against Kash alone." Id. at 536. The Court speaks,
therefore, of the separable controversy as a cause of action complete in itself
and different from the one making up the rest of the case. See also Torrence
v. Shedd, 144 U.S. 527, 530, 12 Sup. Ct. 726, 36 L. Ed. 528 (1892).
41. 115 U.S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113, 29 L. Ed. 319 (1885).
42. Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co., 39 F.2d 309 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 840 (1930); Nebraska v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 69
F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1946); Lucania Societa Italiana Di Navigazione v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 15 F.2d 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
43. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 539 (1931). The reasoning of this case is questionable. Actually, the
Pacific decision refused removal of the case as a whole because a part of it
was an administrative rather than a judicial proceeding. The suit viewed as
a whole did not constitute a "case or controversy" in the constitutional sense.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (1950). See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c)
(1950). The concept, "separate and independent claim or cause of action," may
prove more difficult to apply than separable controversy. Compare Bentley v.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 81 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. Tex. 1948), rev'd,
174 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949), and Buckholt v. Dow Chemical Co., 81 F. Supp.
463 (S.D. Tex. 1948), with Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
174 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949), Billups v. American Surety Co., 87 F. Supp.
894 (D. Kan. 1950), and Butler Mfg. Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Sales Corp.,
82 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Mo. 1949). Cf. Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110
F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1953), 67 HARv. L. REv. 519 (1954); Duffy v. Duffy,
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The new provision is broader than the old in two respects. It per-
mits the entire case to be removed even where the causes of action
which show no grounds of federal jurisdiction are separate from,
and independent of, the cause of action involving grounds of juris-
diction and justifying removal. Also, it applies to cases where the
parties are not citizens of different states but a federal question or
some other ground of jurisdiction is involved in one of the claims
or causes of action. Formerly the entire case could be removed only
when it contained a controversy wholly between citizens of different
states.
The new provision may be considered narrower in two respects.
It applies to a controversy in an action only if the controversy
constitutes a separate claim or cause of action, and even then the
district court has discretion to remand all causes of action which
do not involve independent grounds of jurisdiction. The choice of
language in the subsection is striking in its use of both claim and
cause of action. In other sections the reviser has followed the example
of the Civil Procedure Rules by using the word "claim," and omitting
any reference to cause of action.
COUNTERCLAIMS
It seems clear that the Supreme Court of the United States if
presented with the question would hold that a counterclaim is a
cause of action separate and distinct from the cause of action on
which the plaintiff brings his suit. The court has repeatedly said
that for jurisdictional purposes a cause of action consists of the
violation of a right.40 5 The plaintiff's claim is based upon his right
and the defendant's counterclaim upon his right. If the plaintiff
files a counterclaim it will be upon a right different from the one
upon which he originally sued. Any other party filing a counter-
claim will also rely on his own right. Thus each counterclaim is based
upon its own cause of action. If the doctrine of Hurn v. Oursier
were extended to include counterclaims a district court could never
89 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1950). Compare Harward v. General Motors Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 170, 173 (E.D.N.C. 1950), with American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6, 71 Sup. Ct. 534, 95 L. Ed. 702 (1951), on the point whether a given
case which was removable under the old separable controversy provision
could possibly be removable under § 1441 (c). And see Oldland v. Gray, 179
F.2d 408 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 948 (1950), in which removal of"separable controversy" is passed upon without any notice being taken of
the change in statutory language.
45. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 Sup. Ct. 534, 95 L. Ed.
702 (1951); United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 68, 53 Sup.
Ct. 278, 77 L. Ed. 619 (1933); Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S.
316, 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed. 1069 (1927).
46. Hann v. Venetian Blind Corp., 15 F. Supp. 372, 377 (S.D. Cal. 1936),
aff'd, 111 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1940); Hauser v. Burge, 121 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Mo.
App. 1938); Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 145 Wash. 59, 258 Pac. 1028 (1927).
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entertain a counterclaim unless it showed independent grounds for
jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court decided in Moore v. New York
Cotton Exchange47 that a district court having jurisdiction of a suit
because of the plaintiff's claim can entertain a compulsory counter-
claim over which there would be no jurisdiction if it were brought
as a separate suit. Probably the three principal reasons for a different
result concerning counterclaims are (1) the court ordinarily looks
to the complaint rather than to later pleadings to determine juris-
diction; (2) a court in order to do justice must hear the defendant's
defenses and there is much in common between counterclaims and
defenses; (3) a counterclaim can be filed only by a person who is
already in court as a party to the action. In the Moore case a com-
pulsory counterclaim was involved and it was not necessary for
the Supreme Court to decide whether the rule laid down would
apply also to permissive counterclaims. The lower federal courts
have repeatedly said that there is a distinction from the standpoint
of federal jurisdiction between compulsory and permissive counter-
claims and that a permissive counterclaim requires independent
grounds of jurisdiction.48 No case gives a satisfactory discussion of
this proposition and in practically all of the cases where the state-
ment was not dictum the decision was erroneous because the counter-
claim was actually a compulsory one.4 The decided cases on this
question are believed to be unsound for a number of reasons.
First, the federal statutes confer jurisdiction over certain actions,50
and an action is begun by the plaintiff1 and includes any counter-
claim filed in connection therewith. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure speaks of claim and counterclaim as parts of the
same action and provides for a separate final judgment upon either,
only when a special determination is made by the court. The authori-
ties generally seem to support this view of an action.52
47. 270 U.S. 593, 46 Sup. Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 750 (1926).
48. The cases are collected in Green, Federal Jurisdiction over Counter-
claims, 48 N.W.L. REV. 271, 283-84 nn.65-69 (1953).
49. See, e.g., Derman v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944), over-
ruled, Cutting Room Appliances Corp. v. Empire Cutting Machine Co., 186 F.2d
997 (2d Cir. 1951).
50. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1333 (1949), 1334-1359 (1950).
51. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 3.
52. E.g., Eng. Rules of Sup. Ct., 0.19, r.3., Ann. Prac. 1945, p.352; the New
Jersey rule quoted in Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Counter-
claims, 2 F.R.D. 250, 258 (1943). Consult also the language of N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
ACT § 271 recognizing parties to counterclaims as parties to action begun by
plaintiff. See Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257, 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880)
(counterclaim is a part of the same action as the plaintiff's claim within the
meaning of the federal removal statute although it could be considered a
suit by itself under the state statute); Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action,
42 AIcH. L. REv. 257 (1943). A counterclaim or set-off is not a separate action.
Pate v. Gray, 18 Fed. Cas. 1291, No. 10,794a (Ark. Ter. 1831); Taylor v. New
York, 82 N.Y. 10, 19 (1880); Otto v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 400,
51 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1944); White v. Hil, 283 S.W. 529 (Tex. Civ. App.
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Second, the jurisdiction of the court is determined as of the time
the action is brought.53 When jurisdiction is based upon a federal
question in the case the allegations of the complaint must show that
the action arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States. 54 "What the defendant claims when his turn comes is im-
material."55
Third, trial efficiency, convenience and economy are promoted by
disposing of both claims in one action.56 If the jurisdictional statutes
are ambiguous, considerations such as these may properly influence
the courts in giving a meaning to the congressional language.
57
Fourth, a court necessarily has the power to hear defensive counter-
claims. The federal district courts have both chancery and common-
law jurisdiction and consequently can entertain any defense which
the substantive law and the rules of procedure permit.53 A counter-
claim may be used to reduce or prevent the plaintiff's recovery and
in that respect is similar to a defense.59
Fifth, it is impractical to distinguish between defensive and of-
fensive use of counterclaims so far as federal jurisdiction is con-
cerned. If the counterclaim consists of a claim by defendant for
money damages and is interposed to a claim by plaintiff for damages,
the use of the counterclaim as a defensive set-off, and the granting
or refusing of the affirmative relief to the defendant, usually depend
on the same issues and evidence. When the two phases of the counter-
claim are disposed of together in the federal court the additional
burden on the court is small, but when the federal court is limited
to hearing the counterclaim as a defense and it turns out that there
is a balance due the defendant he must bring a separate action to
1926); Craigen's Executrix v. Lobb, 12 Leigh 627 (Va. 1841); In re Milwaukee
Commercial Bank. 236 Wis. 105, 294 N.W. 538 (1940).
53. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539, 6 L. Ed. 154 (U.S. 1824).
54. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 Sup. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed. 70
(1936); Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 44, 14 Sup. Ct. 654,
38 L. Ed. 511 (1894).
55. BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
56 (5th ed. 1949). Consequently a district court cannot entertain a case con-
sisting of a claim by plaintiff which could not be sued on alone in federal
court and a counterclaim which is within federal jurisdiction. Goldstone v.
Payne, 94 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1938). Cf. Isenberg v. Biddle, 125 F.2d 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1941).
56. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 645 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, The Influence of Federal
Procedural Reforn, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 154 (1948).
57. The effect of a given interpretation is relevant. American Security and
Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U.S. 491, 32 Sup. Ct 553, 56 L. Ed.
856 (1912). See also Cook, Scientific Method and the Lawv, 13 A.B.A.J. 303,
308 (1927); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV.
886, 893 (1930).
58. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54 (2d ed. 1948); Shulman and Jaegerman,
Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 414-
15 (1936).
59. Flagg v. Locke, 74 Vt. 320, 52 Atl. 424 (1902); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
640 (2d ed. 1947).
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
recover this balance.60 In such instances the federal court and the
state court will frequently have to hear the same evidence; the claim
will be established in the federal court for the purpose of defeating
the plaintiff's claim and then will be established over again by calling
the same witnesses and introducing the same documents in the state
court so that an affirmative judgment may be obtained for the balance
over and above what was used defensively in the federal court. Some
state courts will probably hold that this procedure, if permitted,
would lead to the splitting of a single cause of action, and that the
state court action could not be maintained.(" The result would be
that the defendant must choose between allowing the plaintiff to
recover against him or filing the counterclaim and extinguishing his
claim against the plaintiff. This is unfair to the defendant.0 2 Even in
a jurisdiction which did not take this view against dividing up the
claim of the federal-court defendant the result of using the same
claim in two actions is undesirable. Expense is increased, additional
time is consumed, and unnecessary effort is required.
Even where the counterclaim seeks an injunction or a declaratory
judgment or any form of relief other than damages, it may be more
convenient to try the defendant's claim in the plaintiff's action. The
objections to requiring the defendant to sue in the state court are
not as great, but the counterclaim is a part of the action and where
plaintiff's claim is within the jurisdiction of the federal court the
entire action should be entertained.
Although it has been said that if a plaintiff wishes to assert an
additional claim the better practice is for him to amend his com-
plaint,63 it is fairly clear that he may state the claim as a counter-
claim,6 so far as procedure is concerned. From a jurisdictional stand-
point the counterclaim should be allowed even in those instances
in which the plaintiff could not have included it originally in the
complaint in the federal court or added it by amendment. It should
be allowed first, because jurisdiction of the action gives jurisdiction
of the counterclaim which is part of the action, and second, because
60. When the plaintiff's claim is unliquidated, the only way to ascertain
the balance is through a special verdict or interrogatories to the jury. This
might be necessary even in some cases of liquidated claims as where the
defendant has filed both a denial and a counterclaim.
61. Riddle v. McLester-Van Hoose Co., 145 Ala. 307, 40 So. 101 (1905);
2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 792 (5th ed. 1925). Contra: RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 57 (1942).
62. RESTATEMENi, JUDGMENTS § 57, comment a (1942).
63. Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. John Bowen Co., 1 F.R.D. 274 (D. Mass.
1940); cf. Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 48 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
64. Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. John Bowen Co., 1 F.R.D. 274 (D. Mass.
1940); Warren v. Indian Refining Co., 30 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Ind. 1939). Pro-
fessor Moore answers his own objection when he cites Rule 8(d). 3 MoonE,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 23 (2d ed. 1948).
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a counterclaim can be fied only in response when an opposing party
has pleaded a claim 5 and thus differs from claims in the complaint.
The same reasoning applies to jurisdiction of counterclaims against
cross-claimants or intervenors or third-party plaintiffs or by third-
party defendants against the original plaintiff. The latter claims are
limited to those arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff and have been held not to require independent grounds of
jurisdiction.66
As to whether the amount of the defendant's counterclaim may be
added to the amount claimed by the plaintiff to determine the value of
the matter in controversy, the authorities are in conflict.
67
If removal is sought under Section 1441 (a) of a case involving a
counterclaim, problems are encountered similar to those discussed
above in connection with original jurisdiction. If removal, is based
on Section 1441 (c), is plaintiff's claim "joined with" the counter-
claim so as to come within the provisions of the subsection? A district
court case gives a negative answer but the reasons for its decision are
not clearly stated.68
CRoss-CLAIMS
A cross-claim may consist of any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action, or of a counterclaim therein or
relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original
action. 9 If the cross-claim arises out of the subject matter of the
original action, independent grounds of jurisdiction are probably
unnecessary.7 0 Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange appears to be
sufficiently similar to furnish a case in point. If the cross-claim
arises out of the subject matter of a permissive counterclaim which
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 13; Morris, Wheeler & Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 4
F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945).
66. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
67. Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141, 24 Sup. Ct. 619, 48
L, Ed. 911 (1904); Central Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 Fed.
13 (7th Cir. 1918); McKown v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C.C.W.D.
Ark. 1901). Compare DoBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 144-50
(1928), with 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 58 (2d ed. 1948). See also 38 VA. L.
REV. 108 (1952).
68. Collins v. Faucett, 87 F. Supp. 254, 255 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g).
70. Collier v. Harvey, 179 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1949); Mathis v. Ligon, 39
F.2d 455 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 846 (1930); United States F. & G.
Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian
Mining Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C.C.D. Mont. 1906); Almacanes Fernandez, S.A. v.
Golodetz, 8 FED. RuLEs SERV. 14a.21, Case 1 (N.Y. 1944). Contra: Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Suits, 40 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 861
(1930). See Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Hall, 70 F.2d 608,
610 (5th Cir. 1934).
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involves no federal question or other grounds of jurisdiction (assum-
ing that the grounds of jurisdiction in the plaintiff's claim would
enable the court to take jurisdiction of the counterclaim), we have
less pyramiding of subject matter, based on the jurisdiction of the
main claim, than would sometimes occur in the filing of a counter-
claim to a counterclaim. Nevertheless, some may think that taking
jurisdiction of the cross-claim is allowing the tail to wag the dog.
The present writer believes that the logic of treating the cross-claim
as a part of the "action," "case or controversy" and the desirability
of settling the parties' disputes in one action justify an interpreta-
tion allowing the cross-claim.
IVMLEADR
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
defendant may file a third-party complaint against a person who is
or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. When
the basis for entertaining the plaintiff's claim is diversity of citizen-
ship the court can entertain a third-party complaint against a person
who is a citizen of the same state as the original plaintiff because there
is diversity between the third-party plaintiff and such person (third-
party defendant) .1 Even when the defendant and the third-party
defendant are citizens of the same state the court has the power
to deal with the dispute between them if there is diversity of citizen-
ship between plaintiff and defendant and plaintiff's claim involves
the required amount. This is true because the third-party proceed-
ings are said to be ancillary.72 Consequently, when jurisdiction is
based on a federal question in plaintiff's case the federal district
court will have jurisdiction of an accompanying third-party com-
plaint arising under state law and between citizens of the same
state.73
The decided cases have usually held that the plaintiff can assert
a claim against the third-party defendant only if there are inde-
pendent grounds of federal jurisdiction over the claim.7 4 The reason
71. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir,
1949); Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1948); Wil-
liams v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1942).
72. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.26, at p.496 (2d ed. 1948). Cf. United
States v. Hogansburg Milk Co., 8 FED. RULEs SEaV. 14a.11, Case 4 (N.D.N.Y
1944). The ancillary concept also takes care of the jurisdictional amount. The
third-party complaint need involve no particular amount. Schram v. Roney,
30 F. Supp. 458 -(E.D. Mich. 1939).
73. Metzger v. Breeze Corporations, 37 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1941); United
States v. Pryor, 2 F.R.D. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
74. E.g., Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Friend v. Friend, 328 U.S. 865 (1946)' Southwest Lime Co.
v. Lindley, 12 F.R.D. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). Contra: Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D.
594 (ED. Pa. 1941).
[ VOL. 7
MULTIPLE-CLAIMS CASES
given is the inability of the plaintiff to add to his complaint a non-
federal claim against a citizen of the plaintiff's state. The grounds
supporting the main claim are insufficient for a second claim against
a different defendant added to the complaint by amendment even
when both claims arise out of the same transaction. Before finally
accepting this reasoning the courts should weigh the fact that the
plaintiff cannot assert a claim against a third-party defendant as
such until he is brought into the case by the defendant. It is arguable
that this is sufficient to distinguish between claims against ordinary
defendants and those against third-party defendants.
7 5
INTERPLEADER
A specific section of the Judicial Code authorizes the district courts
to take jurisdiction of an action of interpleader in which there are
two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship as defined in
Section 1332 of the Code who claimed money or property or certain
benefits from the plaintiff of the value of $500.00 or more.76 The
present section is broader than the one in force prior to 1948 because
the earlier provision required the claimants to be citizens of different
states whereas under the new provision one of the claimants can
be an alien if the other is a citizen of a state. Indeed, the claimants
may have any citizenship covered by the combinations described
in Section 133277 and the citizenship of the plaintiff may be the same
as that of one of the claimants.78 The value of the matter in con-
troversy need not exceed $500.00.
Prior to the enactment of a specific statutory provision the federal
courts could entertain a bill of interpleader if the federal and equity
jurisdictional prerequisites were satisfied. They can still exercise
this power, it seems, and thereby take jurisdiction of a case which
does not satisfy the requirements of the interpleader statute.79 Thus
a district court may adjudicate an interpleader action in which the
plaintiff is incorporated in one state and the claimants are citizens
of another, provided the value of the matter in controversy exceeds
75. See Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Md. 1941).
76. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (1950).
77. Ibid.
78. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85
(1939). The opinion assumes that the plaintiff has no interest in the con-
troversy. This is not always true. Compare John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938), with Boice v. Boice, 135 F.2d 919
(3d Cir. 1943).
79. The lower federal courts which have passed on the question have almost
unanimously reached this result. See Note, 172 A.L.R. 823 (1948). The Treinies
case said: "We do not determine whether the ruling here is inconsistent with
the conclusion in those cases where jurisdiction was rested on diversity of




$3000. 0P Likewise an alien corporation can interplead claimants
who are all citizens of a single state, if the usual jurisdictional amount
is present.81 Hence, the interpleader statute has the effect of con-
ferring or confirming 82 jurisdiction but not limiting it.
A striking difference occurs as to the application of the doctrine
of Strawbridge v. Curtiss. If jurisdiction is asserted on the ground
of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the claimants,
diversity must be complete because reliance is placed on the general
provision for jurisdiction (Section 1332) .P On the other hand, if
the specific interpleader statute (Section 1335) is relied on, com-
plete diversity between the claimants is not necessary. It is sufficient
if there is diversity between two adverse claimants even though
another claimant is a citizen of the same state as an opposing claim-
ant.84
There have been few reported cases of attempted removal of an
interpleader action from a state to a federal court 5 but there seems
to be no reason why such actions should not be covered by the pro-
vision that any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction may be removed.86
CLASS AcTIONs
The true class action, which is provided for in Rule 23 (a) (1), is
not within the scope of our subject because such an action involves
a single common claim of many persons. Each of the actions provided
for in Rule 23 (a) (2) and (3), by definition, is made up of several
claims. They therefore pertain to the subject of this article. If
jurisdiction is based on diversity, only the citizenship of the persons
named in the complaint as parties is considered. The citizenship of
the other members of the class will not defeat the jurisdiction.87
Furthermore, members of the class can intervene in the action and
the common citizenship of the intervenors and parties on the other
side will not defeat the jurisdiction.8 8
The amount of the claim of each original plaintiff of record must
80. Rossetti v. Hill, 162 F.2d 892, 172 A.L.R. 821 (9th Cir. 1947).
81. Security Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481
(9th Cir. 1937).
82. See First Nat. Bank v. Bridgeport Trust Co., 117 Fed. 969 (C.C.D. Conn.
1902).
83. Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, 5 F.R.D. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
84. Ibid.
85. Von Herberg v. Seattle, 27 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Von Herberg, 278 U.S. 644 (1928); First
Nat. Bank v. Bridgeport Trust Co., 117 Fed. 969 (C.C.D. Conn. 1902); Bailey
v. The New York Savings Bank, 2 Fed. 14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
86. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a) (1950). Subdivision (b) would be a limitation
on the right of removal in some instances. Could an interpleader action ever be
removed under (c)?
87. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed. 329 (1885).
88. Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
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be more than $3000.00; since the claims of several cannot be added
together to make the value of the matter in controversy.8
INTMVENTON
Intervention presents another variation of the multiple-claim
situation. An attempt by a person who is an indispensable party and
who is a citizen of the same state as a party on the other side, to
intervene in a diversity-of-citizenship case will inform the court that
actually diversity is not complete and will result in a dismissal of the
entire case. 0 If a person is not indispensable the court will have
jurisdiction of'the original action without regard to his citizenship; 91
he may become a party later if his intervention is ancillary. Unless
the intervenor's claim can be considered ancillary it must involve
diversity of citizenship or other grounds of jurisdiction.92 Whether
a particular proceeding of this type is incidental and therefore
auxiliary is left in considerable doubt and confusion. The authorities
are in conflict. 13 It would seem appropriate to treat an intervention
as ancillary whenever the intervenor's presence will aid in the
disposition of the main action.9 - However, some courts have made the
existence of custody or control by the court of property or a fund
the test.9 5 In a class action a member of the class is permitted to
intervene even though the district court could not entertain his
claim in a separate action.9 6
TnE CoNsTITUTIoN
The difference regarding multiple-claim cases between original
and removal jurisdiction was described above. Obviously the Con-
stitution does not mention removal of cases from state courts. It
would seem that removed cases would have to fall within the judicial
power described in Article III, Section 2. Thus the fundamental law
applicable to federal judicial power over cases filed originally in
the district courts of the United States is the same as that applicable
89. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67
L. Ed. 865 (1923); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 40 Sup. Ct. 503, 64 L. Ed.
883 (1920); Russell v. Stansell, 105 U.S. 303, 26 L. Ed. 989 (1881).
90. Charleston Nat. Bank v. Oberreich, 34 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Ky. 1940).
91. A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1907).
92. Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552, 44 Sup. Ct. 407, 68 L. Ed. 845
(1924).
93. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 139, 140-46 (2d ed. 1950).
94. Note, 55 HARv. L. REv. 264 (1941).
95. Fulton Nat. Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 45 Sup. Ct. 261, 69 L. Ed.
609 (1925); see the circuit court opinion quoted in Forest Oil Co. v. Craw-
ford, 101 Fed. 849, 850 (3d Cir. 1900). See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Sun
Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
96. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163, 29 L. Ed. 329 (1885);
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 137, 146 (2d ed. 1950).
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to removed cases, but Congress, acting within the framework of the
fundamental (constitutional) law, has enacted separate provisions
for original and removal jurisdiction. The federal courts other than
the Supreme Court do not derive their power directly from the
Constitution but can exercise only so much of the constitutional
judicial power as is conferred on them by statute. 7 The difference
between original and removal jurisdiction results from the fact that
Congress conferred more of the constitutional jurisdiction when
providing for removal. The Supreme Court has not expressly decided
how Article III, Section 2, applies to cases or controversies involving
multiple-claims, but as pointed out above the Court seems to assume,
in the decisions on separable controversies that jurisdiction over two
or more causes of action may be based on the diversity of citizenship
in one (the separable controversy).
In Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Felt,98 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the authority to deal with
a whole case, removed on the ground that it contained a separable
controversy, by saying that such a case was within the ancillary
jurisdiction. A simpler explanation is that an act of Congress con-
ferred jurisdiction of the case involving the separable controversy
and the language of the Constitution is broad enough to justify the
power exercised by Congress. The pertinent language of Article
III, Section 2 is:
"The judicial power of the United States shall extend ... to controversies
... between citizens of different states."
If these words have their ordinary meaning the controversy is
between citizens of different states whenever one of the parties is
a citizen of one state and a party on the other side is from a different
state. A literal reading of the Constitution does not require that
all the parties from the same state be on one side of the case. Mr.
Justice Bradley while on circuit said:
"Were this an original question, I should say that the fact of a common
state citizenship existing between the complainants and a part only of
the defendants, provided the other defendants were citizens of the proper
state, would not oust the court of jurisdiction. It certainly would not
under the constitution. The case would still be a controversy between
citizens of different states. But the strict construction put by the courts
97. United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 Sup.
Ct. 527, 536, 53 L. Ed. 837 (1909); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S.
175, 29 Sup. Ct. 451, 53 L. Ed. 753 (1909).
98. 150 F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 1945). The suggestion has been made that
the power of Congress is derived from the necessary and proper clause. Hoff-
man v. Lynch, 23 F.2d 518, 522 (N.D. Ga. 1928).
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upon the judiciary act is decisive against the jurisdiction; and I am
bound by it."99
Thus the judicial power described in the Constitution extends to an
action by a citizen of State 1 against a citizen of State 2 and a citizen
of State 1. Barney v. Latham, the separable controversy case, seems
to be based on this conclusion although the Supreme Court does not
say so. Strawbridge v. Curtiss found in an act of Congress the
requirement of complete diversity for cases begun in the federal
district court by the plaintiff. The opinion clearly says that the
statute is being interpreted.10 0 The situation would not arise in
admiralty so far as removal jurisdiction is concerned but in connec-
tion with original jurisdiction a problem similar to the one involving
federal-question jurisdiction is presented and also a problem peculiar
to admiralty.' Perhaps the most doubtful clause is the one relating
to aliens. It certainly is arguable that a case in which one cause of
action is between a citizen of a state and an alien and the other
cause of action is between the plaintiff and another citizen of the
same state and arises under state law, is not a controversy between
citizens of a state and foreign citizens or subjects.
Like the provision relating to citizens of different states, the clause,
"9controversies to which the United States shall be a party," seems
perfectly clear. Just as an action containing a cause of action between
citizens of different states is still a controversy between citizens of
different states within the meaning of the Constitution even when it
contains additional causes of action which are not between such
citizens, so the entire suit by the United States as an individual or
corporation is a controversy to which the United States is a party
although the claim by the other plaintiff is a separate cause of
action.10 2 The federal-question provision, has been thought by some
to be ambiguous. 0 3 Chief Justice Marshall, however, interpreted the
99. Lockhart v. Horn, 15 Fed. Cas. 751, 753, No. 8445 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871)
(italics added). Accord, Whelan v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 35 Fed. 849,
859 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888). The word "controversy" in Article HI means a
civil case. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356, 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 250, 55
L. Ed. 246 (1911); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239, 57
Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937). Mr. Justice, Bradley is saying that the
Constitution does not require each party to the case to be a citizen of a
different state from every party in the other side. It seems that the diversity
clause of Article III does not even require all parties to the case to be citizens
of states. This may be the theory upon which Congress adopted 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(a)(3) (1949).
100. 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (U.S. 1806). See also Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71, 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85 (1939).
101. See notes 12, 13 and 14 supra.
102. Cf. Erickson v. United States, 264 U.S. 246, 249, 44 Sup. Ct. 310, 68 L.
Ed. 661 (1924). Jurisdiction over actions against the United States is not
based on the judicial power described in Article MI. Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553, 53 Sup. Ct. 751, 77 L. Ed. 1372 (1933); but see United States v.
Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603, 25 L. Ed. 143 (1879).
103. 'What do we mean by the words, arising under the Constitution?
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clause authoritatively at an early day. Although the case, Osborn
v. Bank of the United States,'0 did not involve more than one claim,
the views expressed in the opinion are applicable to the multiple-
claim situation. The Chief Justice said:
"We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it."105
Earlier in the opinion he said of the contrary interpretation:
"On the opposite construction, the judicial power never can be extended
to a whole case, as expressed by the constitution, but to those parts of
cases only which present the particular question involving the construc-
tion of the constitution or the law." 0 6
Reading the two quotations together leads to the conclusion that
by "cause" Marshall meant "case." Although cause is sometimes
used by lawyers as a shortened expression for cause of action,1' 7 more
often cause means case, action or suit. 08 The context shows that
the latter meaning was intended in the Osborn case. It follows that
Osborn v. Bank can be read so as to support the theory that the
Constitution does not prevent a federal court from entertaining all
the claims or causes of action in a case when one of them arises
under a law of the United States. Hum v. Oursler can be reconciled
with this theory by limiting the decision to an interpretation and
application of the statute. This is consistent with the language of
the opinion and the practice of the Supreme Court to avoid the
decision of constitutional questions when the case can be decided
by the construction of a statute. 0 9 Therefore the constitutional lan-
guage "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority," permits federal courts to receive
authority to entertain multiple-claim cases which include causes of
action that would not be within the jurisdiction if sued on alone.110
What do they relate to? I conceive this to be very ambiguous." Edmund
Randolph, 2 ELLIO's DEBATES 417, 419 (1828).
104. 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (U.S. 1824).
105. Id. at 823.
106. Id. at 822.
107. E.g., CLAR, CODE PLEADING 132 (2d ed. 1947).
108. Blyew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595, 20 L. Ed. 638 (U.S. 1871);
6 WoRDs AND PmAsEs 332-38 (1940); BouviER, LAw DICTlONARY 156 (2d ed.,
Baldwin, 1946).
109. Cases cited note 97 supra.




Did Congress adopt this view of its authority under the diversity
clause, the federal-question clause, and the other clauses of Article
III, Section 2, when it passed Section 1441 (c)"1 as a part of the
revised Title 28, United States Code, or did it merely adopt the
theory of the court of appeals in the Felt case, that the jurisdiction
over the otherwise nonremovable cause of action is ancillary?
CoNcLusIoN
The Supreme Court seldom has found it necessary to interpret the
provisions of the Constitution relating to the judicial power. The
few pronouncements of the Court on the subject show a much more
liberal attitude toward the Constitution than toward the statutory
provisions. It has been said that the power to settle controversies
between a state and citizens of another state is remedial and, there-
fore, to be construed liberally. 12 Because all the power described in
Article III, Section 2, is granted so that the federal courts may settle
controversies, the opinion was saying in effect that the judicial power
is remedial and to be construed liberally. On the other hand, the
Court holds that the statutes conferring jurisdiction are to be strictly
construed.11 3 This results in practically the same language receiving
different interpretations but the Court has recognized that identical
words may have different meaning in a statute from that which they
have in the Constitution. 1
4
The application of the principles of federal jurisdiction to multiple-
claim cases is in a state of development. The ancillary concept has
been used to sustain the addition of nonfederal claims to suits over
which the court had previously acquired jurisdiction." 5 In some of
these cases the concept seems to be strained. A similar result could
be reached by thinking of the interjected claims as parts of the
original action and the jurisdiction as unaffected by changes in the
action after it is begun.1 6
Many of the questions remain undecided. For authoritative answers
it is necessary to await the future.
111. Quoted in text at note 21 supra.
112. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 476, 1 L. Ed. 440 (U.S. 1793).
113. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78 L. Ed. 1248 (1934).
114. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 36 Sup. Ct. 255, 60 L. Ed. 526 (1916).
115. But it has not been considered applicable to joinder in the complaint
except on removal nor to permissive counterclaims.
116. See note 53 supra.
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